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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this research is to compare, by means of a counterfactual analysis, the 
economic performance of Piedmontese agro-food enterprises in 2005-2012, period characterized by 
the economic crisis, in relation to whether they received fundings during the last two programming 
periods. In particular, the main objective is to analyse the role played by the Rural Development 
Programme in the agro-food businesses in Piedmont and the effects of financing on the enterprises 
under investigation. The results provide insights and guidelines for policy makers as well as for 
researchers involved in the evaluation of public policies and they can be used to elaborate effective 
interventions and targeted actions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
he research presented here broadens 
and deepens the results of the in 
itinere evaluation (2010) of the 
Rural Development Programme (RDP) of the 
Region of Piedmont (Italy), which showed the 
existence of the so called ‘picking the 
winners’ effect. However, given that in 2010 
the time elapsed since the adoption of new 
systems and equipment was not enough to 
properly evaluate the effects, this article aims 
to achieve more complete results.  
The RDP represents the main tool to 
accommodate changes in the rural space and 
to support the agricultural, agro-food, and 
forestry sectors. Financed by the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
European Social Fund (ESF), the RDP 
focuses on four main areas: improving the 
competitiveness of the agricultural and 
forestry sectors; improving the rural 
environment and the countryside; increasing 
the quality of life in rural areas and the 
diversification of the rural economy; and the 
LEADER initiative expected to augment the 
links among actions and territories for the 
development of the rural economy. 
Considering that the financial resources 
allocated to the RDP in Europe for the 2007-
2013 period amount to 147 billion Euro, it 
clearly emerges how important it is to assess 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
programme.  
This survey analyses the effects of 
investments financed through the Measure 
123, aimed at increasing the added value of 
agricultural and forestry products. The 
beneficiaries of this Measure are small and 
medium enterprises dealing with the 
transformation, processing, distribution and 
marketing of agricultural and forestry 
products. Some of the priority objectives of 
the Measure 123 are: promoting the 
processing of agricultural and forestry 
products; encouraging the involvement of 
primary production sectors in the promotion 
of products; strengthening the economic and 
environmental performances of the 
enterprises; improving the quality of products 
and encouraging diversification and 
innovation.  
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 
the theoretical framework and the present 
research are described; section 3 provides an 
overview on the RDP measures for the agro-
food industry; section 4 shows the results 
obtained while concluding remarks are given 
in the final section. 
2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
AND THE RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY  
This work aims to better understand the role 
played by the Rural Development Programme 
(RDP) to support the agro-food industry in 
Piedmont, by means of counterfactual 
analysis. The agro-food sector is the portion 
of the production chain dealing with food 
processing and characterised by the highest 
added value.  
Differently from other production sectors, it 
includes various types of businesses: large 
farming enterprises, cooperatives of 
producers, as well as processing industries. 
The role and effects of public support 
measures is a much debated subject in the 
economic literature (Bezlepkina et al., 2005; 
Kleinhanß et al., 2007; Alston and James, 
2002; Sckokai and Moro, 2009, Cerulli, 
2010), with some scholars claiming that 
T 
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public support can have negative effects on 
the enterprises (Bergström, 2000; Bakucs et 
al., 2007; Rizov, 2013) and other scholars 
detecting positive effects (Mary, 2013; 
Galanopoulos et al., 2011; Czarnitzki and 
Lopes-Bento, 2013).  
In relation to the case study presented here, 
have funded activities improved the 
performance of enterprises? Should 
beneficiary enterprises be the businesses 
which can be defined as having the best 
performance (Calabrese, 2008) or the 
businesses mostly in need of public subsidies 
(Bojnec and Latruffe, 2013)? If the answer is 
yes, what are the implications in terms of 
policy and programmes?  
To answer the above research questions, this 
work takes into account the financial 
statements of the sample enterprises in order 
to analyse certain variables of interest at the 
microeconomic level. The economic 
indicators considered concern: business 
development, enterprise organisation, 
financial structure, assets structure, and 
profitability. 
The in itinere evaluation carried out in 2010 
(Milanetto et al., 2011), by comparing the 
economic performance of the two sets of 
enterprises under investigation, confirms the 
existence of a ‘picking the winners’ effect. In 
other words, the enterprises of the agro-food 
sector which received subsidies had the best 
financial and economic performance for what 
concerns both the 2007-2013 and the 2000-
2006 programming periods. These 
preliminary results, therefore, show that the 
most successful enterprises on the market 
were also the most inclined to innovate and 
the most suited to receiving public funding.  
Considering that in 2010 the enterprises had 
received financing but the time elapsed since 
the adoption of new systems and equipment 
was not enough to evaluate the effects of the 
investments, it seems important to complete 
the assessment by including this aspect. 
When the implementation of a policy and its 
effects are evaluated, it is best to start by 
performing a process analysis. This does not 
study the effects caused by the policy 
implementation but analyses the whole 
process, from policy formulation to the actual 
offer of services/interventions, trying in 
particular to understand if the way in which 
the programme is managed is in line with its 
implementation guidelines and the target users 
envisaged and if it is possible to improve it 
while it is already in progress (Cariola, 2005). 
However, due to lack of time and resources, 
the evaluation typically performed focuses 
solely on the results of the policy intervention, 
which primarily involves an evaluation of 
performance. In general terms, this evaluation 
applies analytical methods to produce, starting 
from empirical observations and the collection 
of mainly quantitative data, an assessment of 
the results achieved by implementing a certain 
action. Therefore, the scope of the analysis is 
limited to the aspects of an action which have 
a direct or indirect impact on the external 
environment, both for what concerns the 
outputs used externally and in terms of 
changes in the environment which the action 
aims to produce. In order for the performance 
analysis to reach its full potential, it should be 
followed by an impact analysis, to be 
performed once the intervention is concluded 
and using control groups which were not 
targeted by it, i.e. the so-called counterfactual 
analysis. Choosing the control groups – i.e. 
subjects which are similar to the beneficiaries 
but did not receive subsidies and are observed 
in order to understand what the situation 
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would be like had the action not been 
implemented, so as to measure its net effect – 
is no easy task and often leads to 
unsatisfactory results. Indeed, it is rather 
difficult to separate the effects of variables 
directly linked to a certain policy action from 
the effects other variables existing within a 
certain context which might have led to 
similar results also in the absence of subsidies 
(Martini, 2006). 
The impact analysis and the counterfactual 
analysis always prove difficult to apply, 
especially because it is complicated to identify 
meaningful explanatory variables in the 
medium-long term and because they require 
long follow-up times to monitor results.  
This is why they are rarely used in 
combination. 
Performance evaluation is in an 
intermediate position along a scale of various 
assessment levels, since it does not merely 
acknowledge what has been done – which 
does not specifically require the analytical 
interpretation of data and information needed 
for performance evaluation –, but it is not yet 
able to determine whether the final objectives 
of a policy action have become stabilised in 
the long run, thus changing the pre-existing 
status quo, which is, instead, what an impact 
analysis aims to verify. 
Based on these assumption and on the fact 
that, as mentioned in the introduction, the 
main purpose of this research project was to 
compare agro-food businesses in Piedmont 
which received and did not receive economic 
support through the Rural Development 
Programme, we tried to reduce as much as 
possible the criticalities highlighted above – 
mainly linked to the application of a 
counterfactual analysis able to identify truly 
explanatory comparison variables – by using 
all the tools and data on the actions analysed 
which were available at the regional level.  
More specifically, for what concerns the 
beneficiaries of the actions, the analysis was 
carried out on enterprises which received 
public subsidies in the last two European 
programming periods. In order to do this, we 
considered enterprises which received 
financing at least once through: Measure G 
“Improving the processing and marketing of 
agricultural products”, referring to RDP 2000-
2006 of the Piedmont Region; Measure 123.1 
“Adding value to agricultural products”, 
referring to RDP 2007-2013 of the Piedmont 
Region. 
The comparison between beneficiary 
enterprises and the control group also made it 
possible to achieve another objective, i.e. 
describing and analysing the agro-food system 
in Piedmont, concentrating in particular on its 
economic and financial performance during 
the 2005-2012 period.  
The analysis was carried out by dividing the 
enterprises into five main agro-food 
production chains: wine production chain, 
cereals and rice production chain, meat 
production chain, fruit and vegetables 
production chain, and dairy products 
production chain.   
The investigation included three distinct 
phases. During the first phase, we constructed 
a comprehensive picture of the agro-food 
system in Piedmont.  
In the second phase, we carried out a 
performance evaluation on the economic-
financial results of the enterprises and the 
trends of the 2005-2012 period. Lastly, we 
adopted the counterfactual approach to study 
the positioning of beneficiary enterprises in 
comparison to other Piedmontese enterprises 
which did not receive subsidies. 
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The analysis was performed on data from 
Bureau van Dijk’s AIDA database (“Analisi 
Informatizzata Delle Aziende”), which 
provides financial statement data for a large 
number of Italian corporations and 
cooperatives. Corporations represent only a 
small portion of the total entrepreneurial 
activities in the agro-food sector, but they are 
largely predominant in terms of employment, 
creation of added value, and investments. 
Choosing to use the AIDA database enabled 
us to concentrate on larger and more 
structured enterprises, such as corporations 
and cooperatives. Moreover, it allowed us to 
also include enterprises belonging to the 
primary sector, something which is not 
possible if other databases are used. By 
including the agricultural sector, we were able 
to look at medium-large agro-food businesses 
dealing with production as well as processing. 
The corporations which were active at the 
time of the research were extracted from the 
AIDA database. 
It should be underlined that, for the 
purposes of this research, an active business is 
understood as an enterprise which filed its 
financial statements in the two most recent 
years (2011 or 2012). By doing so, we 
avoided excluding businesses which were late 
in filing their financial statements. 
Lastly, the available time series concerning 
financial statement data offered us the 
opportunity to further investigate the trends of 
some performance indicators.  
This was done on a panel of businesses 
belonging to the agro-food industry for which 
financial statement data for the entire 
observation period (2005-2012) were 
available.  
 
On the one hand, this methodology makes it 
possible to elaborate coherent time series, 
allowing for sound time comparisons. On the 
other hand, however, it reduces the number of 
businesses analysed, since it excludes 
enterprises set up or gone out of business after 
the first year under investigation as well as 
enterprises which underwent corporate 
changes during the period in question.  
As for the micro-economic analysis of the 
enterprises, choosing to use the AIDA 
database allowed us, thanks to financial 
statement information, to study some 
variables of interest which are rather 
meaningful within a counterfactual 
framework, since they are clearly defined and 
stable, hence easily comparable over time.  
More specifically, the indicators used for 
the purposes of this work are the following: 
 indicators on business development and 
organisation: average number of 
employees, value added per employee, 
capital per employee; 
 profit indices:  
-ROE (net): Return On Equity is the rate 
of return on equity, given by the ratio 
between net income and total equity; it 
is a synthetic measure of an enterprise’s 
profitability. 
- ROI: Return On Investment is an index 
calculated as the profit deriving from 
the capital invested in the firms over the 
total amount of capital invested. 
- ROS: Return On Sales is an index of 
economic performance of sales, given 
by the ratio between net operating 
margin and turnover and indicating the 
average operating profit per unit of 
revenue. 
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3. AGRO-FOOD INDUSTRY AND 
PUBLIC SUPPORT: THE RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
The agro-food industry is the production 
sector including agro-food businesses in the 
narrower sense of the word as well as 
enterprises producing technologies and 
services for this sector. The main technologies 
and services are: agricultural machinery, 
processing and packaging systems, packaging 
materials, traceability and process control 
systems, management systems, engineering 
services, food and quality technologies, 
patents, trademarks, regulatory and legal 
updating. 
Agricultural production, processing, and 
distribution are the three main segments of the 
agro-food production chain, divided, in turn, 
into sub-production chains. The agro-food 
system of Piedmont is extremely variegated, 
although it displays some characteristics 
which are common to all its production chains 
and is strongly linked to certain peculiar 
features of the region. The region’s agro-food 
production can be schematically divided into 
two types: undifferentiated production 
(commodities) and highly specialised 
production (specialities). The first category 
comprises cereals, meat (with some 
exceptions), milk and dairy not linked to 
typical productions, and most fruit and 
vegetables. The second group, instead, 
includes DOC (Controlled Designation of 
Origin) wines, cheeses with or without the 
IGT certification (Typical Geographical 
Indication), traditional agro-food products 
(known as PATs), meat with guaranteed breed 
and quality certification, organic products, etc.  
For what concerns public policies targeting 
this sector, agriculture in Piedmont has 
heavily relied on the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP put in 
place a system of rewards and obligations 
which deeply influenced the farmers’ income 
and production choices. Other relevant aspects 
concern financing for structural interventions 
(Rural Development Programme and regional 
or national laws), as well as hygiene-health 
and environmental regulations, which are 
becoming increasingly strict due to the 
growing importance of environmental issues 
within the framework of rural policies. 
The purpose of this section is to provide a 
brief description of the two measures included 
in the Rural Development Programme which 
focus on the agro-food industry. The first is 
Measure G, referring to the 2000-2006 
programming period, while the second, 
Measure 123, refers to RDP 2007-2013. The 
results of the analysis performed on the 
beneficiaries of these two measures are 
illustrated below. It should be noted that both 
measures continue and complete the actions 
initiated through Regional Law 95/95 
"Regional Interventions for the development 
of Piedmont’s agro-food system”. 
Measure G “Improving the processing and 
marketing of agricultural products” had 
among its key objectives the modernisation of 
agro-food processing equipment, the 
modernisation of agro-food marketing 
equipment, and a wider commercialisation of 
quality products, in particular typical and 
superior products strongly linked to the local 
territory. Accordingly, incentives were put in 
place to promote investments in processing 
and marketing equipment and in quality 
control systems. The beneficiaries of Measure 
G were mainly enterprises and, in particular, 
corporations, whereas cooperatives played a 
more marginal role. 
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By means of Measure 123 “Adding value to 
agricultural and forestry products”, the 2007-
2013 Rural Development Programme of the 
Piedmont Region continued the work initiated 
during the previous programming period, 
specifically through Measure G. Measure 123 
comprises three actions aimed at increasing 
the value added of agricultural and forestry 
products and at supporting the development of 
micro-enterprises for the processing and 
marketing of agricultural products. 
Investments for which subsidies are available 
must pursue one of the following objectives: 
increasing the efficiency of harvesting, 
processing, and marketing processes; 
promoting the use of agricultural and forestry 
products to produce renewable energy for 
self-consumption; developing new products, 
processes, and technologies; reaching new 
market outlets; investing to increase quality 
and achieve product certifications, pursuing 
greater environmental protection; and 
encouraging waste recycling and disposal. 
This brief introduction highlights the fact 
that, when comparing enterprises which were 
supported through RDP subsidies to non-
beneficiary enterprises, it is fundamental to 
take the differences between the two groups 
into account. First of all, beneficiary 
enterprises display specific characteristics 
thanks to which they were able to receive 
financial aid from the RDP.  
Secondly, further differences characterise 
the enterprises supported through Measure G 
and the enterprises supported through the 
Measure 123. Although this paper does not 
illustrate in detail the requirements needed to 
apply for the subsidies, it is worth noting that 
the selection criteria for the two programming 
periods are partially dissimilar. To begin with, 
the first element of discontinuity is given by 
the different orientation of the two measures, 
which implies different types of beneficiaries. 
The ultimate goal of Measure G was to boost 
the quantity of products, whereas the Measure 
123 aimed to increase the quality of products. 
Indeed, the inputs, scenarios, and policies 
which led to the drafting of the Rural 
Development Programme for 2000-2006 and 
for 2007-2013 resulted in different choices to 
define the limitations regulating access to 
financial aid. As briefly mentioned above, 
difficulties in finding not only appropriate 
comparison variables but especially control 
groups of non-beneficiaries truly similar to the 
beneficiaries represent the chief limitation of a 
valid counterfactual analysis. In cases like 
this, when completely homogeneous data are 
not available, one might make the drastic 
choice to forego the comparison. Yet, we 
believe that even an imperfect correspondence 
between the two groups can lead to 
meaningful results, provide useful elements to 
evaluate the effects of the policy measures 
under investigation, and offer a preliminary 
evaluation of the role played by rural 
development policies in support of the agro-
food sector. 
4.  RESULTS OF THE 
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS  
AND REMARKS ON THE EFFECTS 
OF THE SUBSIDIES 
Let us now turn to the most significant 
differences emerging from the comparison 
between the enterprises subsidised through the 
Measures 123 and G and the enterprises 
which did not receive any financing.  
Table 1 lists the number of enterprises 
which received aid through the two measures 
analysed   here   as   well   as   the  number  of  
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Table 1 – Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of regional aid: 
number of enterprises by production chain. 
 
Production chain 
Beneficiaries 
Non-beneficiaries 
Measure 123 Measure G 
Cereals and rice 5 6 279 
Meat 7 13 152 
Milk and dairy* 14 26 128 
Fruit and vegetables 15 34 231 
Grapes and wine 10 39 266 
Other 3 4 28 
Total 54 122 1.084 
Source: Piedmont Region.  
 
 
enterprises included in the control group 
(non-beneficiaries). The enterprises are 
divided on the basis of the production chain to 
which they belong.  
The column “Beneficiaries of RDP funding 
at least once” refers to enterprises which were 
financed only once, either through Measure 
123 or through Measure G or through both. 
It can be seen that the enterprises which 
were financed through the RDP at least once 
represent 14% of the total, whereas 86% of 
the enterprises did not receive any aid. The 
main beneficiaries of the RDP were 
enterprises operating in the grapes-wine 
sector, while the highest number of non-
beneficiaries is found in the cereals and rice 
sector. 
Table 2 illustrates the data regarding the 
first variable chosen for the counterfactual 
analysis, i.e. the average estimated number of 
employees per enterprise. It emerges that the 
beneficiaries of Measure 123 were medium-
small enterprises but, on average, larger (41 
employees on average) than the enterprises in 
the control group (13 employees on average).  
The same conclusion is reached when the 
beneficiaries of Measure G are analysed, since 
they are noticeably bigger (46 employees on 
average) than the enterprises in the control 
group.  
Considering the 2005-2012 period, both the 
beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries are 
generally characterised by a decrease in the 
number of employees.  
Beneficiaries went from 51 to 45 
employees, whereas non-beneficiaries went 
from 23 to 14 employees. Hence, both groups 
of enterprises suffered due to the economic 
crisis, which translated into personnel cuts, 
although these were more limited in the case 
of the RDP beneficiaries.  
However, despite a drop in personnel 
between 2005 and 2009, which was equal to 
54% among non-beneficiaries and 20% 
among beneficiaries, a recovery is detected in 
the 2009-2012 period, with 26% and 10% 
staff increases respectively.  
These preliminary data hint at positive signs 
in the second three-year period, especially in 
relation to size growth.  
Said growth is more visible among non-
beneficiaries, which had, however, been more 
affected by personnel cuts during the crisis 
years. 
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Table 2 – Average estimated number of employees per enterprise (2012). 
Production chain 
Beneficiaries 
Non-beneficiaries 
Measure 123 Measure G 
Cereals and rice 16 42 19 
Meat 90 49 8 
Milk and dairy* 43 52 14 
Fruit and vegetables 39 42 10 
Grapes and wine 24 45 9 
Other 30 68 41 
Total 41 46 13 
Source: own elaboration from AIDA. 
 
Moving on to evaluate the profitability 
indicators for what concerns the beneficiaries 
of funding from Measure 123 and Measure G 
as well as the enterprises in the control group, 
it is worth underling that significant 
differences have been detected in relation to 
all the profitability aspects analysed. The 
beneficiaries’ level of profitability is much 
higher than that of non-beneficiaries, an 
aspect which stimulated further investigation. 
As shown in table 3, the counterfactual 
analysis also regarded changes in value added 
per employee during the period between 2005 
and 2012.  
It emerged that in 2005 the two groups of 
enterprises did not display remarkably 
different values. Actually, the values of the 
control group were slightly higher than those 
of the beneficiaries. However, the gap 
widened over time, so much so that in 2012 
there was a diametrically opposite situation. 
The value added per employee had grown by 
24% among the beneficiaries, whereas it had 
dropped by 9% among non-beneficiaries.  
The production chains displaying the most 
significant increase were: the milk and dairy 
production chain, the cereals and rice 
production chain, and the grapes and wine 
production chain. Conversely, decreases are 
found in the meat and fruit and vegetable 
sectors.  
A more refined analysis was also performed 
using parametric (T-test) and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon) tests, which confirms that major 
differences exist between the beneficiaries 
and the control group. 
 
Table 3 – Added value per employee, 2005-2012. 
 
Year 
Beneficiaries 
Non-beneficiaries 
Measure 123 Measure G 
2005 57.465 65.884 65.612 
2007 74.535 73.772 67.340 
2009 86.484 78.282 63.072 
2012 77.665 71.078 50.096 
Source: own elaboration from AIDA 
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Table 4 – Capital per employee, 2005-2012. 
Year 
Beneficiaries 
Non-beneficiaries 
Measure 123 Measure G 
2005 122.159 123.508 119.041 
2007 134.351 176.396 161.642 
2009 161.800 261.604 227.732 
2012 218.945 208.195 191.958 
Source: own elaboration from AIDA 
 
Looking now at the enterprises’ capital per 
employee (table 4), the data once again show 
that the enterprises which received RDP 
funding at least once were more virtuous. In 
2005 they already displayed higher values, 
and their growth rate during the 2005-2012 
period was more considerable than that of 
agro-food enterprises which were not granted 
access to public funding. These findings are 
somehow predictable and fully in line with the 
type of financing enjoyed by the beneficiaries.  
Indeed, it should be underlined that the 
funding made available through both 
measures aimed at boosting competitiveness 
was, therefore, used to finance major 
structural actions in the beneficiary 
enterprises. Since capital per employee is an 
indicator of an enterprise’s level of 
mechanisation, the beneficiaries increased 
their fixed capital through financing and, as a 
result, ended up having higher values of 
capital per employee than the enterprises 
belonging to the control group. More 
specifically, when analysing the first 
profitability indicator, i.e. ROI (table 5), it can 
be seen that the beneficiaries displayed a 
lower index than the control group for most of 
the period between 2005 and 2012. ROI refers 
to an enterprise’s profitability in relation to 
the capital invested. Since they increased the 
capital invested thanks to public financing, as 
for the ratio between operating results and 
said capital (which is the denominator of this 
ratio) the beneficiaries display a lower value 
than the non-beneficiaries, which probably did 
not invest large sums during the period in 
question. However, this might mean that a rise 
in capital thanks to public financing was not 
actually able to stimulate a proportional (or 
more than proportional) increase in operating 
income, which is directly related to an 
enterprise’s core activities. Hence, in terms of 
greater profitability of the capital invested, 
public support does not appear to have been 
very effective. Indeed, the enterprises which 
received aid through at least one RDP 
measure had the lowest ROI in 2012, although 
in 2007 it was higher than that of non-
beneficiaries. It is worth pointing out that the 
trend reversed in 2009.  
Yet, it should be noted that the investments 
made by the beneficiaries thanks to public 
funding might not have yielded immediately 
detectable results over such a short period. 
Therefore, especially when looking at the 
profitability indices linked to Measure 123 – 
more concerned with structural rather than 
incremental innovations –, it is not yet 
possible to determine whether their decrease 
in 2012 is due to the limited effectiveness of 
public actions or depends on the short time 
elapsed, insufficient to understand if the 
investments achieved the income objectives 
pursued by the Measure. 
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Table 5 - ROI of non-beneficiaries, beneficiaries of Measure 123, 
and beneficiaries of Measure G, 2005-2012. 
Year 
Beneficiaries 
Non-beneficiaries 
Measure 123 Measure G 
2005 5,33 4,94 5,32 
2007 6,94 5,69 5,37 
2009 4,22 4,15 3,93 
2012 3,31 3,27 3,78 
Source: own elaboration from AIDA 
 
 
 
Table 6 - ROS of non-beneficiaries, beneficiaries of Measure 123,  
and beneficiaries of Measure G, 2005-2012. 
Year 
Beneficiaries 
Non-beneficiaries 
Measure 123 Measure G 
2005 2,33 2,37 2,05 
2007 3,66 1,88 1,95 
2009 2,94 1,46 1,39 
2012 1,59 1,57 1,42 
Source: own elaboration from AIDA 
 
 
When examining another key profitability 
indicator, ROS, which considers operating 
income in relation to sales, the beneficiaries 
display a more positive trend, which then 
reverses in the most recent period, probably 
also due to the difficult economic 
circumstances and other factors already 
underlined in the analysis of ROI. Lastly, 
ROE displays a more uneven trend, which 
makes it harder to draw significant 
conclusions, but the difficulties encountered 
are probably the same as those mentioned 
above for the other two indices. In any case, 
all the beneficiary enterprises seem to be 
characterised by larger amounts of capital per 
employee, so that their labour profitability is 
higher, which, however, does not translate 
into greater profitability levels than those of 
the control group. The productivity indicators 
analysed show that the effectiveness of public 
actions aimed at stimulating competitiveness 
in the sector is not yet extremely evident, at 
least in the short term. Indeed, a 
comprehensive counterfactual evaluation of 
this kind would require a follow-up analysis 
over a much longer period of time after the 
implementation of public support measures.  
To conclude, it is worth underlining that the 
enterprises able to access structural funds tend 
to be larger and better organised, which means 
that they can invest time and resources in the 
difficult process of submitting a funding 
application, but they are not necessarily the 
most profitable, above all after 2010.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
The sample under investigation comprises 
enterprises which received financing 
earmarked for the agro-food industry during 
the periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 and 
enterprises which did not received public 
support. Even if the sample includes various 
types of businesses: large farming enterprises, 
cooperatives of producers, as well as 
processing industries, from the results it can 
be concluded that the economic downturn has 
generally affected the entire agro-food sector, 
reducing its profit margins.  
Within this scenario characterised by a 
negative economic situation, the performance 
evaluation carried out by means of a 
counterfactual analysis shows that the 
enterprises which received public aid were not 
always able to curb the impact of the crisis 
more effectively than the non-beneficiary 
enterprises belonging to the control group. 
They managed to do this in terms of value 
added per employee, capital invested per 
employee (also thanks to their larger size), 
and, more generally, in relation to job 
retention. Vice versa, profitability understood 
in the narrower sense, expressed by indicators 
like ROI and ROS, did not display a more 
positive trend among the beneficiaries, 
affected by the economic crisis especially in 
the more recent period. Indeed, in 2012, these 
values were lower for the control group, but to 
a more limited extent. However, as already 
mentioned above, if the aim is to provide a 
realistic evaluation of the underlying policies, 
a comprehensive counterfactual analysis of 
this kind would require a follow-up analysis 
over a much longer period of time after the 
implementation of public support measures. 
Furthermore, as pointed out at the beginning 
of this paper, a counterfactual analysis does 
indeed have certain limitations, linked to the 
fact that it is rather difficult to separate the 
effects of variables directly linked to a certain 
policy action from the effects other variables 
existing within a certain context or related to 
(not always observable) intrinsic enterprise 
characteristics, which might have led to 
similar results also in the absence of subsidies. 
In this regard, an interesting point emerged 
from the questionnaire presented to the 
enterprises which received funding through 
Measure 123 – the results of which were 
presented during the RDP in itinere 
evaluation. When they were asked whether 
they would have made investments even 
without receiving public subsidies, 49% of the 
enterprises gave a positive answer. Almost 
half of the sample stated that they were 
willing to innovate even if this meant using 
their own resources. This result is cause for 
reflection, as it seems to support the 
abovementioned hypothesis that the 
beneficiary enterprises are more geared 
towards innovating and intercepting public 
aid, while also having more financial 
resources to make effective investments. On 
the other hand, this suggests that public funds 
might be a valid tool to strengthen the 
competitiveness of enterprises, even though 
this is not always true. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that 49% of the enterprises declared 
that they would have made investments even 
without RDP support, no information is 
available on the quality of these investments if 
public contribution had not been received. 
Hence, another sound hypothesis might be 
that, without public aid to the agro-food 
industry, around half of the enterprises would 
have made investments, but these would have 
been qualitatively inferior.  
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If this hypothesis had been confirmed, 
Measure 123.1 would have indeed succeeded 
in strengthening the competitiveness of the 
beneficiaries. Yet, the counterfactual analysis 
involving a comparison with the control group 
of non-beneficiaries indicates that, especially 
in relation to the profitability of the capital 
invested, the performance of the non-
beneficiaries is not actually very different 
from that of the beneficiaries. Indeed, as 
already underlined, the non-beneficiaries were 
less affected by the crisis than the 
beneficiaries, thus showing that they were 
somehow more able to cope with a difficult 
economic situation. 
This hypothesis was, however, not 
confirmed by the empirical evidence 
emerging from a previous analysis of 
economic performance referring to 2005-
2009. The beneficiaries of both Measure 123 
and Measure G coped better during the crisis 
than the non-beneficiaries. For what concerns 
the financing provided by the new RDP, since 
most of the enterprises which were being 
supported had not yet made their investments 
in 2009, the positive data might be ascribed to 
these enterprises’ stronger competitiveness. 
As for the aid offered during the previous 
programming period, the hypothesis that 
investments had an effect on the enterprises’ 
competitiveness is confirmed. 
On the one hand, as expected, it emerges 
that sounder enterprises are better equipped 
with the skills and means to devote financial 
resources (time and professional expertise) to 
the preparation and submission of funding 
applications, diverting said resources from 
their everyday business activities. On the 
other hand, this situation raises major 
questions about whether public funding 
should be allocated to the enterprises which 
would achieve positive results even without it. 
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